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INTRODUCTION 
The United States Supreme Court’s decision in Knick v. Township 
of Scott1 ostensibly addresses only a procedural issue: Whether an 
aggrieved property owner must first seek compensation in state court 
via a state inverse condemnation action before seeking access to the 
federal courts or whether, instead, she can immediately bring a federal 
takings claim in federal court. 
Viewed solely as a procedural decision, Knick itself might seem to 
be, basically, no big deal.  After all, nothing in the Knick majority 
opinion purports to alter what rights in property or rights to 
compensation for interferences with property anyone enjoys in the 
United States.  All the Knick decision does, on its face, is open the 
federal courthouse doors more quickly than is currently the case to 
those claiming to have had their property taken without just 
compensation in violation of the Fifth Amendment of the U.S. 
Constitution.2  Although Knick may shift the initial decisionmaker in 
many federal takings cases — from a state judge to a federal judge — 
it does not purport to challenge the constitutional status of state 
property law as the underpinning of federal takings law.  Nor does it 
purport to challenge the test and principles that are to be applied in 
determining whether an interference with a property right under state 
law requires the payment of just compensation as a matter of federal 
constitutional law.3 
Nevertheless, Knick may have real consequences for substantive 
law, both state and federal.  The purpose of this Article is to explore 
those implications for substantive law, suggest that they are highly 
problematic from a normative perspective, and consider how the 
possible adverse effects of Knick might be mitigated. 
In our constitutional order, property law (with very limited 
exceptions, like federal patent rights) is the domain of state law, not 
federal law.  Property rights in land in every state are largely created 
by, interpreted by, and enforced under state law.4  Land-use regulation, 
 
 1. 139 S. Ct. 2162 (2019). 
 2. See infra text accompanying notes 29–33 (describing what I term a narrow 
reading of Knick). 
 3. Only Justice Kagan’s dissent addresses the substance of federal takings law 
doctrine, and then only to make the point that federal takings law builds on state 
property law. Knick, 139 S. Ct. at 2186 (Kagan, J., dissenting). 
 4. See Maureen Brady, Property’s Ceiling: State Courts and the Expansion of 
Takings Clause Property, 102 VA. L. REV. 1167, 1168 (2016) (“[I]t is generally agreed 
that state property law — and typically, the judge-made common law of the state — 
define the range of interests that qualify for [federal] constitutional protection.”); 
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in particular, is overwhelmingly a matter of local enforcement of state 
and local, not federal law.5  As the physical realities, economies, 
histories, legal traditions, and political cultures of states differ 
substantially, so too does substantive state property law.6  That 
diversity in state substantive property law is a strength of our legal 
system; it allows property law to adapt to local conditions.7  Notably, 
as climate change causes rises in sea level, flooding, drought, wildfires, 
and mudslides, among other phenomena, affecting different parts of 
the country very differently, the argument for a localized substantive 
property law that is sensitive to and adapts to local conditions becomes 
even more compelling.8 
The Knick opinion is troubling in that it may result in the effective 
usurpation (albeit only a partial usurpation) by the federal courts of 
the state courts and legislatures’ role as the authors of substantive 
property law.  For a variety of reasons, explicated below, federal judges 
may not consistently interpret state property law — and especially 
“fuzzy” background principles of law that limit rights of titleholders, 
such as nuisance and public trust — in the same way as state courts 
would.9  It seems quite plausible that, as a result of Knick, state 
substantive law will be interpreted by federal courts to sometimes 
afford state officials and regulators less flexibility to deal with the land 
use challenges posed by climate change than they otherwise would 
have at their disposal.  Knick thus can be understood as an impediment 
to the productive adaptation of state property law to the real-world 
demands of climate change adaptation.  In theory, certification of state 
property law issues to state supreme courts can prevent federal 
 
Stewart E. Sterk, The Federalist Dimension of Regulatory Takings Jurisprudence, 114 
YALE L.J. 203, 222 (2004) (describing the primacy of state property law). 
 5. See, e.g., FERC v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742, 767 n.30 (1982) (describing land 
use regulation as “perhaps the quintessential state activity”); see also Sara C. Bronin, 
The Quiet Revolution Revived: Sustainable Design, Land Use Regulation, and the 
States, 93 MINN. L. REV. 231, 236 (2008) (“[T]he prevailing descriptive and normative 
view of land use involves, first and foremost, local control.”). 
 6. See, e.g., Daniel L. Siegel, Why We Will Probably Never See a Judicial Takings 
Doctrine, 35 VT. L. REV. 459, 461 (2012) (“State courts in particular have a special 
ability to develop rules of property grounded in the individual State’s unique history 
and physical landscape.”). 
 7. See WINSTON HARRINGTON, RESOURCES FOR THE FUTURE, PROMOTING 
INNOVATIVE CLIMATE CHANGE ADAPTATION THROUGH FEDERALISM (2010), 
https://media.rff.org/documents/RFF-IB-10-17.pdf [https://perma.cc/Y9ZH-QRG6] 
(emphasizing advantages of localized experimentation). 
 8. For a thoughtful discussion of how state property law will need to be developed 
to meet the needs of climate change adaptation, see Holly Doremus, Climate Change 
and the Evolution of Property Rights, 1 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 1091 (2011). 
 9. See infra text accompanying notes 63–72. 
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usurpation of the state courts’ role in interpreting state property law.  
But certification is never mandatory, and there are currently a number 
of impediments to it.  Some of these impediments, however, could be 
lessened by the federal courts, state courts, and state legislatures, if 
they are willing.10 
The second substantive doctrinal problem posed by Knick is that it 
may destabilize the test for when a compensable “temporary taking” 
has occurred, in such a way as to expand the scope of what constitutes 
a compensable “temporary taking.”  That expansion could chill 
innovative state and (especially) local land use and other regulation, 
and effectively overrule the Supreme Court’s well-reasoned decision in 
Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council v. Tahoe Regional Planning 
Agency.11  By potentially expanding compensation requirements for 
temporary government actions, Knick could deprive state and local 
regulators of the flexibility that they require for effective adaptation to 
climate change.12  Whether Knick has these effects on the substance of 
federal takings law depends ultimately on how courts understand and 
employ Knick as a precedent. 
Part I of this Article provides a brief background to and summary of 
the Knick decision and offers a narrow and broad reading of the 
majority opinion.  Part II explores how Knick may result in 
interference with state courts’ role in interpreting state property law.  
Part II uses a review of denied certiorari petitions involving federal 
takings claims to highlight some of the difficult issues in state 
substantive property law that the lower federal courts will be called 
upon to decide in the post-Knick era.  Part II also considers how much 
the usurpation of state law by the federal courts can be mitigated 
through prudential federal abstention, state judicial and legislative 
corrections of federal interpretations, and certifications to state 
supreme courts.  Lastly, Part III considers how Knick may result in a 
de facto overruling of the Supreme Court’s decision in Tahoe. 
In sum, Knick may upend our constitutional regime that has long 
allocated states the power to interpret their own property law and may 
shift federal takings doctrine toward a more restrictive posture 
 
 10. See infra text accompanying notes 104–08 (discussing possible reforms to the 
law governing federal certification of state issues to state supreme courts). 
 11. 535 U.S. 302 (2002). 
 12. Indeed, since the Tahoe decision, the need for creative approaches to 
protecting sensitive resources like Lake Tahoe from the stresses of climate change has 
only become clearer. See, e.g., Climate Science, U.C. DAVIS, 
https://tahoe.ucdavis.edu/climate-change [https://perma.cc/D7H9-9M6J] (last visited 
Jan. 26, 2020). 
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regarding state and local efforts to fashion solutions to a range of 
problems.  Knick is not just a procedural decision. 
I. TWO READINGS OF THE KNICK OPINION 
State courts are courts of plenary jurisdiction, and thus can hear both 
federal and state constitutional claims.  Because states have 
constitutional guarantees of compensation for deprivations of property 
that mirror the Fifth Amendment Takings Clause,13 property owners 
typically will want to bring both a federal and a state constitutional 
claim for just compensation for the same underlying government 
conduct or restriction.14  In all states, property owners may bring an 
action for inverse condemnation — that is, for the interference with 
property rights (as protected under the state and/or federal 
constitution) to such an extent that the government has, in effect, 
condemned the property, but without paying the compensation that 
would have been paid in a formal eminent domain proceeding.15 
By contrast, federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction.  Section 
1983 of the United States Code affords “any citizen of the United 
States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof” to sue “at law 
[and] in equity” seeking remedies for “deprivation[s] of any rights, 
privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution . . . .”16  Thus, at 
least on the face of Section 1983, a party can bring a suit in federal court 
alleging a deprivation of Fifth Amendment rights based on an alleged 
taking of property without just compensation. 
In 1985, in Williamson County Regional Planning Commission v. 
Hamilton Bank, the Supreme Court articulated a ripeness rule that was 
consistent with precedent but not previously articulated by the Court: 
a federal takings claim is not ripe until a property owner first seeks 
compensation through a state inverse condemnation action, so long as 
such an action provides a “reasonable, certain and adequate provision 
for obtaining compensation” if compensation, in fact, is 
constitutionally due.17  The Williamson County Court’s holding follows 
from a straightforward reading of the Fifth Amendment’s Takings 
 
 13. See Brady, supra note 4, at 1168 n.1 (noting that only North Carolina lacked a 
state constitutional guarantee of compensation for takings). 
 14. See Stewart E. Sterk, The Demise of Federal Takings Litigation, 48 WM. & 
MARY L. REV. 251, 275 (2006) (noting that most litigants opt to bring parallel federal 
and state takings claims). 
 15. For a general review of state inverse condemnation law, see 11A MCQUILLIN 
MUN. CORP. § 32:164 (3d ed. 2019). 
 16. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1996). 
 17. 473 U.S. 172, 194 (1985) (citations omitted). 
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Clause.  The Clause does not prohibit or render unconstitutional 
government takings of property in and of themselves; it requires just 
compensation to be paid in due course, but there is no constitutional 
violation simply because the taking was not accompanied by 
contemporaneous compensation.18 
The Williamson County ripeness holding regarding state inverse 
condemnation action became subject to considerable criticism after the 
Court’s 2005 decision in San Remo Hotel, L.P. v. City & County of San 
Francisco, which created what Chief Justice Roberts in Knick dubbed 
a “preclusion trap” for aggrieved property owners.19  In San Remo, the 
federal court exercised Pullman abstention with respect to the 
plaintiff’s federal takings claim, but after the plaintiff failed to prevail 
in state court, the federal court held that the plaintiff was precluded 
from re-litigating issues that had been litigated in the state court.20  The 
Supreme Court based its preclusion decision on the federal full faith 
and credit statute: 
At base, petitioners’ claim amounts to little more than the concern 
that it is unfair to give preclusive effect to state-court proceedings that 
are not chosen, but are instead required in order to ripen federal 
takings claims.  Whatever the merits of that concern may be, we are 
not free to disregard the full faith and credit statute solely to preserve 
the availability of a federal forum.  The Court of Appeals was correct 
to decline petitioners’ invitation to ignore the requirements of 28 
U.S.C. § 1738.21 
In Knick, the plaintiff landowner pressed the Court to overrule 
Williamson County and hold that her federal takings suit in federal 
court was ripe, although she had brought no inverse condemnation 
action in state court.22  At oral argument, both Justice Breyer and 
Justice Kagan suggested that if the Court could devise some way to 
undo or limit the preclusion trap created by San Remo, there would be 
no reason to overrule the 25-year-old Williamson County precedent.23  
However, rather than doing so, the majority not only expressly 
 
 18. Id. (“The Fifth Amendment does not proscribe the taking of property; it 
proscribes taking without just compensation . . . . Nor does the Fifth Amendment 
require that just compensation be paid in advance of, or contemporaneously with, the 
taking . . . .” (citations omitted)). 
 19. Knick v. Township of Scott, 139 S. Ct. 2163, 2174 (2019). 
 20. San Remo Hotel, L.P. v. City & County of San Francisco, 545 U.S. 323, 338 
(2005). 
 21. Id. at 347–48. 
 22. Knick, 139 S. Ct. at 2169. 
 23. Transcript of Oral Argument at 44–47, Knick, 139 S. Ct. 2163 (No. 17-647). 
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overruled Williamson County, but did so in as emphatic a way as 
possible.24 
Like many takings cases, Knick involved a landowner who claimed 
that a recently-enacted local ordinance took away one of the rights that 
inhered in her land title — in this case, the right to exclude.  In 2008, 
Florence Knick acquired from her sister “approximately 90 acres” of 
farmland in the Township of Scott, Pennsylvania, which includes her 
“primary residence, as well as farmland and grazing areas for horses, 
cattle and other farm animals.”25  It also contains a cemetery, located 
in an open field a substantial distance from her residence, in which her 
neighbors’ ancestors allegedly are buried.26  In 2012, the Township 
enacted an ordinance requiring landowners to adequately “maintain 
and upkeep” cemeteries and not “unreasonably restrict [public] 
access” to them “during daylight hours.”27  The Township subsequently 
concluded Knick was denying access to the cemetery as required by the 
ordinance.28 
The federal district court dismissed the Fifth Amendment Takings 
Clause Section 1983 claim that the ordinance, either on its face or as 
applied, infringed Knick’s constitutional right to compensation for a 
taking of property, on the grounds that she “‘ha[d] not pursued’ the 
state’s ‘constitutionally adequate’ procedure ‘for obtaining just 
compensation.’”29  The Third Circuit affirmed the dismissal, explaining 
that “the government does not violate the Fifth Amendment simply 
because one of its actions ‘constitutes a taking.’”30  Since Pennsylvania 
provided inverse-condemnation proceedings, which constitute “a 
reasonable, certain and adequate provision for obtaining 
compensation,” and Knick had not invoked the requisite state 
procedure, she could not claim to have been deprived of her 
constitutional right to compensation for a taking.31  The Supreme 
 
 24. See infra Part III (explicating how the rhetoric of Knick implicates substantive 
takings doctrine, apart from issues of procedure and jurisdiction). 
 25. See Brief for Respondents at 13, Knick 139 S. Ct. 2162 (No. 17-647) 
(summarizing the facts alleged by Knick). 
 26. Id. 
 27. Id. at 14 (quoting Scott Township, Pa., Ordinance 12-12-20-001 §§ 5–6 (Dec. 20, 
2012)). 
 28. Id. 
 29. Id. at 16 (citation omitted) (quoting Knick v. Township of Scott, No. 3:14-CV-
02223, 2016 WL 4701549, at *6 (M.D. Pa. Sept. 8, 2016). 
 30. Knick v. Township of Scott, 862 F.3d 310, 324 (3d Cir. 2017). 
 31. Id. at 326 (citations omitted). 
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Court granted certiorari to address the question of whether Williamson 
County’s state litigation ripeness requirement should be overruled.32 
The narrow reading of Knick is that it simply holds that an aggrieved 
property owner need not seek redress in state court first but may 
instead proceed in federal court under Section 1983, seeking just 
compensation for a taking.  The majority held that Williamson County 
not only lacked cogent reasoning, but misread the precedent available 
at the time it was decided.  For the majority, because the error of 
Williamson County was so clear, it had to be reversed, notwithstanding 
principles of stare decisis.33 
But the Knick majority also articulated broader ideas — ones that 
have possible implications beyond the elimination of a state litigation 
requirement.  The broad holding of Knick is that the federal 
constitutional compensation must happen at the same time or 
immediately after a taking has occurred.  In deciding whether a taking 
occurred, courts must be as relentingly protective of property rights as 
they are of, say, freedom of religion or speech.  Knick thus articulates 
a reconceptualization of when a Fifth Amendment violation occurs (at 
the time of the taking, not the denial of just compensation) and at least 
hints at a shift as to when courts should find such a Fifth Amendment 
violation has occurred (namely, more often than they have in the past).  
Articulation of these broader ideas was not necessary for the majority 
to reach the result of overruling Williamson County.34 
The Knick majority was adamant that the denial of compensation — 
let alone just compensation — is not required for there to be a 
constitutional violation: “[T]he violation is complete at the time of 
taking . . . .”35  The majority claimed that First English Evangelical 
Lutheran Church v. Los Angeles County already had held that “a 
property owner acquires an irrevocable right to just compensation 
 
 32. See Knick v. Township of Scott, 138 S. Ct. 1262 (2018) (granting certiorari solely 
on the question of whether to overrule Williamson County). 
 33. Knick v. Township of Scott, 139 S. Ct. 2162, 2178–79 (2019). 
 34. See, e.g., Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae in Support of Vacatur 
and Remand at 8, Knick, 139 S. Ct. 2162 (No. 17-647) (arguing that vacating the 
dismissal of Knick’s complaint did not require the Court to hold that a taking occurs 
as soon as a property right is infringed without contemporaneous provision of 
compensation). 
 35. Knick, 139 S. Ct. at 2177. The majority stated this idea in a variety of ways, such 
as: “The Fifth Amendment right to full compensation arises at the time of the taking, 
regardless of post-taking remedies that may be available to the property owner[,]” id. 
at 2170; “the property owner has suffered a violation of his Fifth Amendment rights 
when the government takes his property without just compensation . . . [,]” id. at 2168; 
and “a taking without compensation violates the self-executing Fifth Amendment at 
the time of the taking . . . .” Id. at 2172. 
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immediately upon a taking.”36  But actually, First English merely held 
that the Takings Clause was self-executing and judicial invalidation of 
an ordinance, without a damages remedy, was not an adequate remedy 
for a taking.37  First English was consistent with the proposition that an 
aggrieved party may bring an inverse condemnation action in state 
court but may not bring one in federal court until the state courts first 
deny compensation.38 
The idea that compensation is immediately due, if taken at face 
value, calls into question not just the Williamson County state litigation 
requirement, but also any local, state, or federal procedure, process, or 
deliberation that might result in a delay between the acts allegedly 
constituting the taking and the actual grant of just compensation.  
While Knick itself does not explicitly say so, it implicitly strengthens 
the argument that any delay between the physical or regulatory 
deprivation of a property right and the payment of compensation is 
constitutionally problematic. 
Consider this passage, in which the majority analogizes a 
government taking to a bank robbery: 
A later payment of compensation may remedy the constitutional 
violation that occurred at the time of the taking, but that does not 
mean the violation never took place.  The violation is the only reason 
compensation was owed in the first place.  A bank robber might give 
the loot back, but he still robbed the bank.  The availability of a 
subsequent compensation remedy for a taking without compensation 
no more means that there was not a constitutional violation in the first 
 
 36. Id. at 2172 (citing First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. Los Angeles 
County, 482 U.S. 304, 315, 318 (1987)). 
 37. See First English, 482 U.S. at 321–22 (“We merely hold that where the 
government’s activities have already worked a taking of all use of property, no 
subsequent action by the government can relieve it of the duty to provide 
compensation for the period during which the taking was effective . . . . Here we must 
assume that the Los Angeles County ordinance has denied appellant all use of its 
property for a considerable period of years, and we hold that invalidation of the 
ordinance without payment of fair value for the use of the property during this period 
of time would be a constitutionally insufficient remedy. The judgment of the California 
Court of Appeals is therefore reversed, and the case is remanded for further 
proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.”); see also Knick, 139 S. Ct. at 2172 n.4, 
2185–86 (Kagan, J., dissenting) (criticizing the majority’s interpretation of First 
English). 
 38. Indeed, no court after First English until the Knick decision had interpreted the 
First English decision in 1987 as implicitly overruling or even being in tension with the 
Williamson County decision in 1985. As Justice Kagan explained, First English itself 
expressly affirms the continued validity of Williamson County. Knick, 139 S. Ct. at 2185 
n.4 (2019) (Kagan, J., dissenting). 
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place than the availability of a damages remedy renders negligent 
conduct compliant with the duty of care.39 
If a taking itself is a “bank robbery,” then that would seem to suggest 
that the remedy for a taking should not just be available in a reasonable 
amount of time, but rather should be immediately available, no matter 
the administrative difficulties the government may face.  Indeed, the 
only way to make a bank robbery seem like “no big deal” — for it to 
seem lawful — is if a bank robber takes the money from the bank vault 
with one hand and at the very same time places the money back into 
the vault with her other hand. 
The Knick majority also forcefully embraced the view that Fifth 
Amendment property rights stand at the same level — and thus 
deserve the same respect — as the other individual rights secured by 
the Bill of Rights.40  The Court announced itself as rejecting the view 
that the Takings Clause has “‘the status of a poor relation’ among the 
provisions of the Bill of Rights.”41  The Court viewed its opinion as 
“restoring takings claims to the full-fledged constitutional status the 
Framers envisioned when they included the Clause among the other 
protections in the Bill of Rights” by insisting that “[t]akings claims 
against local governments should be handled in the same way as other 
claims under the Bill of Rights.”42  This rhetoric hints at a rejection of 
the post-Lochner idea that in a modern economy, economic regulation 
of the sort that implicates the use of and economic value in property 
must be more deferentially reviewed by the courts than regulation of 
individual liberties, such as speech and the free exercise of religion.43  
This rhetoric, if taken to heart, would call into question the flexible, 
pragmatic, ad hoc approach to federal takings issues that is articulated 
in such cases as Penn Central.44  As explained below, the broad reading 
of Knick could potentially support a re-orientation of substantive 
takings doctrine to make it more favorable to property owners by 
shifting the understanding of when a temporary taking has occurred 
from Tahoe’s relatively pro-government conception to the more pro-
 
 39. Id. at 2172. 
 40. Id. at 2170. 
 41. Id. at 2169. 
 42. Id. 
 43. See David E. Bernstein & Ilya Somin, The Mainstreaming of Libertarian 
Constitutionalism, 77 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 43, 65–70 (2015) (arguing that the 
Supreme Court’s jurisprudence may be moving toward restoring property rights to 
their pre-New Deal status and suggesting that that would be normatively desirable). 
 44. See generally Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104 (1978). 
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property owner conception that was arguably suggested by First 
English. 
II. HOW KNICK COULD DISTORT SUBSTANTIVE PROPERTY LAW 
AND WHAT CAN BE DONE ABOUT THAT 
Although federal courts sometimes heard federal takings cases 
involving state property law before Knick, the pre-Knick regime 
largely left it to the state courts to say what rights state property law 
did and did not afford.  For takings cases that ultimately are appealed 
through the state court system, there is always the theoretical 
possibility of the U.S. Supreme Court granting certiorari.  But the 
Supreme Court grants certiorari on only a tiny fraction of certiorari 
petitions, and correction of state law by state courts does not meet the 
Court’s own stated criteria for granting certiorari.45  As described 
below, federal takings claims rely directly and unavoidably on the 
content of state property law because it is only when a state property 
right exists and then is infringed that a federal takings claim can be 
recognized.  There are good reasons to believe that litigants will 
strategically select a federal forum when they believe that federal 
judges will diverge from the state courts on the substance of state 
property law.  A review of denied certiorari petitions suggests such 
strategic forum shopping will include cases involving areas of state 
property law that are at the heart of climate change and climate change 
adaptation, such as riparian and littoral rights, public trust, and water 
rights.  The last Section of this Part considers three ways in which the 
federal usurpation of state substantive property law as a result of Knick 
might be mitigated. 
A. The State Property Law Content of Federal Takings Cases 
As Justice Kagan highlighted in her Knick dissent, takings cases are 
different from other sorts of constitutional cases because state law — 
specifically property law — is so central to the substance of the claims: 
And a claim that a land-use regulation violates the Takings Clause 
usually turns on state-law issues.  In this respect, takings claims have 
little in common with other constitutional challenges.  The question 
in takings cases is not merely whether a given state action meets 
 
 45. See SUP. CT. R. 10 (listing criteria for granting certiorari); Supreme Court 
Procedures, U.S. COURTS, https://www.uscourts.gov/about-federal-courts/educational-
resources/about-educational-outreach/activity-resources/supreme-1 
[https://perma.cc/4X3A-YWCH] (last visited Jan. 31, 2020) (explaining that the 
Supreme Court accepts only 100 to 150 cases out of 7000 petitions for review per year). 
602 FORDHAM URB. L.J. [Vol. XLVII 
federal constitutional standards.  Before these standards can come 
into play, a court must typically decide whether, under state law, the 
plaintiff has a property interest in the thing regulated . . . . Often those 
questions — how does pre-existing [state] law define a property 
right?; what interests does the law grant?; and conversely what 
interests does it deny? — are nuanced and complicated.46 
The centrality of state substantive property law to takings law is 
underscored by what is still arguably the leading federal takings case 
— Penn Coal Co. v. Mahon.47  In Penn Coal, the Court based its 
holding that a taking had occurred in part on the grounds that the 
mining restriction took a property interest specifically recognized by 
Pennsylvania law — the support estate.48  As Stewart Sterk argues, the 
Takings Clause thus does not protect any particular set of rights in 
property, but rather protects against uncompensated changes in the 
particular set of property rights recognized under state law.49 
This is as true with respect to alleged physical takings as it is for 
alleged regulatory takings.  In the physical invasion cases like Loretto 
v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp.,50 or the easement exaction 
cases like Dolan v. City of Tigard,51 there could be no constitutional 
violation if the party claiming compensation did not own, under state 
law, the physical space at issue and, in particular, the right to exclude 
from that physical space.  In the regulatory takings cases like Penn 
Central,52 there could not even conceivably be a taking unless the 
 
 46. Knick, 139 S. Ct. at 2187 (Kagan, J., dissenting) (citations omitted). 
 47. 260 U.S. 393 (1922). 
 48. Id. at 414. 
 49. See Sterk, supra note 4, at 222 (“[I]f state law did not create property in the first 
instance, then subsequent state action cannot take property.”). Thomas Merrill rightly 
argues that the U.S. Constitution limits the categories of property a state can recognize 
— a state cannot, for example, establish property rights in obscenity or human persons. 
See generally Thomas W. Merrill, The Landscape of Constitutional Property, 86 VA. 
L. REV. 885 (2000). But these limits are largely irrelevant in practice, as states do not 
generally seek to establish property outside of what Merrill describes as the federally 
permissible property categories. 
 50. 458 U.S. 419 (1982). 
 51. 512 U.S. 374 (1994). 
 52. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104 (1978). A study of 
takings decisions by state courts by James Krier and Stewart Sterk, An Empirical Study 
of Implicit Takings, 58 WM. & MARY L. REV. 35 (2016), does not undercut the view 
state court takings decisions can turn more on the definition of state property rights 
than the application of the formal doctrinal tests for whether a taking occurred. Krier 
and Sterk conclude that the state regulatory takings decisions largely ignore or give lip 
service to the U.S. Supreme Court case law, with the overall effect that the state courts 
consign property rights disputes to the political branches. Id. at 92–95. At the same 
time, Krier and Sterk acknowledge that the United States Supreme Court decisions 
themselves clearly leave room for state courts to determine what the doctrinal tests 
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challenged state action — the building prohibition — infringed on a 
property interest protected under state law.  If Penn Central had no 
rights to the airspace above the Grand Central Terminal under New 
York zoning law before the landmark designation, the case could have 
been decided with one sentence; there would be no need for the 
application of a fact-based, ad-hoc test to determine whether there was 
a regulatory taking.  The Supreme Court’s recent decision in Murr v. 
Wisconsin underscored the centrality of substantive property law in 
takings cases,53 and can be understood as an affirmation of federal 
judicial deference to state substantive property law.54 
Moreover, it is not just relatively discrete positive law like title 
statutes and zoning regulations that are central to takings inquiries, but 
also amorphous, and thus readily-subject-to-varied interpretation, 
aspects of state substantive property law.  In Lucas v. South Carolina 
Coastal Council, the majority expressly recognized that background 
principles of state property law could limit the scope of rights included 
in property ownership, even if those limits were not expressed in a 
statute or regulation or other specific positive law source at the time 
 
mean in practice; indeed Krier and Sterk suggest that the Supreme Court’s takings 
jurisprudence has a substantially rhetorical or performative purpose. Id. at 40, 83–84. 
Krier and Sterk do not include a category in their database for decisions where the 
state court found that there was no protected property interest under state law at issue 
and hence there could be no taking whatever formal tests for a taking applied. Instead, 
in at least some cases, they appear to categorize such cases as ones where the state 
court simply disregarded an applicable Supreme Court rule, such as the rule that 
permanent physical occupations are per se compensable under Loretto v. 
Teleprompter. 458 U.S. 419 (1982). For example, in S. W. Sand & Gravel, Inc. v. Cent. 
Ariz. Water Conservation Dist., 212 P.3d 1 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2008), which Krier and 
Sterk categorize as a case disregarding the Loretto per se rule, the Arizona court 
addressed property rights under Arizona water law, which like the water law of many 
arid Western states, is anything but straightforward. The Water District, as part of a 
water conservation and aquifer recharge project, diverted water to a river that abutted 
a gravel company’s land, with the result that the water levels below the land rose and 
the gravel business was disrupted. The Arizona court explained that, under Arizona 
water statutes as construed by the state courts, the State reserves the right to use 
natural channels to move and restore water because “[Plaintiff] South West took its 
property subject to Arizona’s reservation of natural channels to move and store water” 
and [t]he [Water] District was using that channel for the intended statutory purpose, . 
. . . [n]o taking can arise from such activity.” Id. at 5. 
 53. See Murr v. Wisconsin, 137 S. Ct. 1933, 1945 (2017) (instructing that in 
determining the denominator for purposes of estimating the diminution in value borne 
by the claimant, courts should give “substantial weight” to the treatment of the land 
“under state and local law.”). 
 54. Id. at 1948 (“[T]he treatment of the property under state and local law indicates 
petitioners’ property should be treated as one when considering the effects of the 
[building] restrictions. As the Wisconsin courts held, the state and local regulations 
merged Lots E and F.”). 
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title was acquired.55  Lucas, in particular, was referring to state 
common law of nuisance, but the background principle category could 
be and has been interpreted to include public trust, custom, and 
nuisance or harm principles based not just on common law but also on 
state constitutional and statutory sources.56  All of these background 
principles are subject to different understandings.  In most cases, there 
is no single clear answer regarding these background principles.57 
 
 55. Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1029 (1992). 
 56. On background principles and the diverse ways in which they have been 
interpreted by state courts, see Michael C. Blumm & Lucas Ritchie, Lucas’s Unlikely 
Legacy: The Rise of Background Principles as Categorical Takings Defenses, 29 
HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 321 (2005); James L. Huffman, Background Principles and the 
Rule of Law: Fifteen Years after “Lucas”, 35 ECOLOGY L.Q. 1 (2008); Christine A. 
Klein, The New Nuisance: An Antidote to Wetland Loss, Sprawl, and Global 
Warming, 48 B.C. L. REV. 1155 (2007). 
 57. The Knick case is an apt example. At the time the Scott Township ordinance 
was enacted, Pennsylvania case law suggested a background common law principle in 
Pennsylvania law (as in the law of most states) that cemeteries on private land have a 
distinct status imposing special obligations on the landowner. The relevant 
Pennsylvania cases, though, are old and not exactly on point. Other states by common 
law and/or statute require access for either family members or sometimes the general 
public to cemeteries on private land. See Brief of Cemetery Law Scholars as Amici 
Curiae in Support of Respondents at 6–25, Knick v. Township of Scott, 138 S. Ct. 2162 
(2019) (No. 17-647) (detailing the law regarding cemetery access). The Scott Township 
ordinance allowed “not unreasonable” access to a cemetery by the public during 
daylight hours. A Pennsylvania statute enacted a few years after the ordinance 
required that any “individual” have “reasonable access” to a cemetery. See Brief for 
Respondents, supra note 25, at 10–19 (describing both the ordinance and the 
Pennsylvania statute). It is not clear whether the Pennsylvania statute allows access to 
a narrower or broader range of people or under less onerous or more onerous (to a 
landowner) conditions than does the ordinance, as the statute (like the ordinance) 
contains open-ended terms and has not been judicially construed. A court might, as 
Scott Township urged, conclude that the ordinance only codified common law and thus 
took nothing away from Knick. A court alternatively could conclude that the access 
required by the ordinance exceeded that required by common law, but in that case, the 
court would have to determine by how much the required access exceeded the common 
law requirement. Moreover, because the Pennsylvania statute could be taken as 
evidence of what the common law required, as the legislature was apparently seeking 
to codify the common law, a court might need to determine if the access required by 
the ordinance in fact exceeded the access required by the Pennsylvania statute. The 
court thus might find itself, explicitly or implicitly, ruling on whether the Pennsylvania 
statute provides access in excess of what the common law required at the time of 
enactment. In short, a single case involving a local ordinance would require an analysis 
of Pennsylvania common law that could have implications for Pennsylvania common 
law and statutes well beyond the confines of that single case. 
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B. Why Strategic Litigants Will Choose Federal Courts When They 
Believe Federal Courts Will Deviate from What Would Have Been 
the Property Law Interpretations of the State Courts 
One question to be asked about the now-successful effort on the part 
of property-rights groups like the Pacific Legal Foundation58 to 
overrule Williamson County is: Why would parties seeking 
compensation for a taking prefer a federal judicial forum to a state 
one?  The answer is not obvious.  Most property owners in takings cases 
(like Knick) are local — that is, state residents.  Hence the idea that 
federal courts are more impartial to outsiders or strangers (which is the 
basis for diversity jurisdiction) is inapplicable.59  Almost all state 
judges, like federal ones, come from what might be called the 
propertied classes and can identify with what it might mean to be 
subject to government regulation or intrusion.60  Nor, as a general 
matter, is it any cheaper or quicker to litigate in federal court rather 
than state court.  Indeed, Pennsylvania’s inverse condemnation process 
— the process Knick sought to avoid — includes a number of 
safeguards to ensure timely resolution of claims.61 
While there is no reason to think state courts are systematically 
hostile to property rights, parties claiming a taking have every reason 
to prefer a federal forum in one subset of inverse condemnation 
disputes: those where state property law is arguably unclear, but the 
parties and their lawyers’ best estimate is that the state courts would 
hold that there was no property right at issue and hence no taking of a 
property right.  In such cases, parties and their lawyers might think it 
plausible that they would receive a more favorable interpretation of 
state substantive law from the federal courts than the state courts.  As 
discussed below, there are several reasons why a federal court might 
interpret state law more favorably to takings claimants than would 
state courts.62  These reasons all hold even if we (plausibly) assume that 
federal judges in good faith try to assess what state law is to the best of 
their ability, just as state judges do.  That is, these reasons all have to 
 
 58. See James Burling, Winning the Battle against Williamson County, PAC. LEGAL 
FOUND. (June 25, 2019), https://pacificlegal.org/winning-the-battle-against-williamson-
county/ [https://perma.cc/4JL3-83DY] (“True enemies are most often the stuff of epic 
tales and movies. But in real life, our enemies are subtler; many times, they’re unknown 
to most. For decades, one of PLF’s enemies has been a legal precedent called 
Williamson County.”). 
 59. Sterk, supra note 4, at 235. 
 60. Id. at 235–36. 
 61. See Brief for Respondents, supra note 25, at 11 (describing Pennsylvania 
compensation procedures). 
 62. See infra text accompanying notes 63–72. 
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do with the implicit biases and motivated reasoning that the judges 
themselves might not realize they are subject to, but that skilled 
lawyers may be able to sense and strategically capitalize upon given the 
forum shopping now allowed by Knick. 
The first implicit bias is based on political ideology.  Property law, 
which inherently balances individual autonomy with social obligations 
and needs, inherently is viewed (in part) through a political prism.63  
State judicial appointments generally reflect state political culture; 
increasingly, federal judicial appointments reflect only the ideology of 
the President and the party controlling the Senate.  In recent decades, 
this has translated into a great deal of influence on the part of the 
Republican Party and the Federalist Society in screening judicial 
appointees to ensure that they strongly identify as “conservatives.”64  
Thus, in a given state or region, it would be possible to have the federal 
courts dominated by conservative legal ideology even though there are 
few or no state court judges who self-identify as conservative.  
Conservative legal ideology strongly favors individual property rights 
and is skeptical of the efficiency, fairness, and integrity of government 
regulation.65  A hero of the conservative legal movement, Justice 
Scalia, “was a very reliable supporter of private property rights 
 
 63. See generally Gregory S. Alexander, Property’s Ends: The Publicness of 
Private Law Values, 99 IOWA L. REV. 1277 (2014) (exploring the private-public tension 
in property law). 
 64. See MICHAEL AVERY & DANIELLE MCLAUGHLIN, THE FEDERALIST SOCIETY: 
HOW CONSERVATIVES TOOK THE LAW BACK FROM LIBERALS (2013) (tracing 
conservatives’ dominance of the federal judiciary); Henry Gass, The Supreme Court 
and Beyond, How Partisan Are America’s Judges?, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR (Oct. 1, 
2018), https://www.csmonitor.com/USA/Justice/2018/1001/The-Supreme-Court-and-
beyond-how-partisan-are-America-s-judges [https://perma.cc/B9KC-NFK2] (“Federal 
judges have become more partisan, in part because they are all confirmed through the 
highly polarized US Senate confirmation process . . . .”); Brandon Lowrey, How the 
Federalist Society Conquered the Mainstream, LAW360 (Sept. 11, 2019), 
https://www.law360.com/articles/1198067/how-the-federalist-society-conquered-the-
mainstream [https://perma.cc/BVJ7-PZJP] (“In sum, the Federalist Society has been 
able to fill a huge number of seats with stunning efficiency.”). 
 65. See Christopher Serkin, The New Politics of New Property and the Takings 
Clause, 42 VT. L. REV. 1, 4 (2017) (“Conservatives favor an expansive reading of the 
Takings Clause and would require the government to compensate for most, if not all, 
regulatory burdens. For conservatives, this is important as a matter of restorative 
justice — ensuring that property owners are made whole — and as a constraint on 
government.”); Roger Brooks, The Constitution from a Conservative Perspective, 
HERITAGE FOUND. (May 15, 1988), https://www.heritage.org/political-
process/report/the-constitution-conservative-perspective [https://perma.cc/8V8M-
RFJQ] (“A third canon [of conservative constitutionalism] . . . is the conviction that 
property and freedom are inseparably connected. Indeed, the Constitution not only 
makes free enterprise possible, but promotes as well the sanctity of property rights 
through such provisions as the Contract and Takings Clauses.”). 
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advocates” who consistently sided with Court majorities supporting 
takings claimants.66 
Conservative federal judges, precisely because of their ideological 
commitments to individual property rights and skepticism of 
regulation, may be motivated to interpret unclear areas of state 
property law as favoring individual property rights over the 
government’s arguments about the rights and needs of the community, 
public, or environment.67  Imagine, for example, a case in California 
about the extent of public trust requirements of public access over the 
dry sand in beachfront property.  Imagine, too, there is no California 
case precedent squarely on point, and that the Ninth Circuit in a second 
Trump presidency has a super-majority of Trump appointees, whereas 
the California state courts reflect California’s very different political 
culture.  In such circumstances, it seems quite plausible the federal 
courts would interpret unclear California law as embedding a more 
robust right to exclude than would the state courts.  In other words, 
given that it is the legitimate role of state courts to interpret state law, 
the forum shopping enabled by Knick will result in an incorrect and yet 
legally binding interpretation of California law.68 
Another difference between lower court federal and lower court 
state judges is that the latter, but not the former, have a very strong 
incentive in interpreting substantive property law to avoid an 
interpretation that will result in a reversal by the state supreme court.  
It is fair to assume that judges in a judicial hierarchy do not like to be 
reversed.69  When a federal court of appeals tries to estimate what the 
 
 66. John D. Echeverria, Antonin Scalia’s Flawed Takings Legacy, 41 VT. L. REV. 
689, 693 (2017). 
 67. As Daniel Kahan explains: 
[M]otivated cognition refers to the unconscious tendency of individuals to fit 
their processing of information to conclusions that suit some end or goal . . . . 
The end or goal motivates the cognition in the sense that it directs mental 
operations — . . . sensory perceptions; . . . assessments of the weight and 
credibility of empirical evidence, or performance of mathematical or logical 
computation — that we expect to function independently of that goal or end. 
Chris Mooney, What Is Motivated Reasoning? How Does It Work? Dan Kahan 
Answers, DISCOVER (May 5, 2011), 
http://blogs.discovermagazine.com/intersection/2011/05/05/what-is-motivated-
reasoning-how-does-it-work-dan-kahan-answers/ [https://perma.cc/SH3G-J6BK]. 
 68. In theory, takings cases could arise in a state with a very conservative state court 
judiciary but with federal judges thought to be liberal. But in such cases, parties 
bringing inverse condemnation claims would have more incentive to choose the state 
forum than the federal forum, so there would be no distortion in state substantive 
property law. 
 69. See JEFFREY BRAND-BALLARD, LIMITS OF LEGALITY: THE ETHICS OF LAWLESS 
JUDGING 70–71 (2010) (discussing judges’ dislike of reversal); LEE EPSTEIN ET AL., THE 
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state supreme court would rule in an area where the state case law is 
unclear, the judges do not really have to worry that their interpretation 
will be reversed by the U.S. Supreme Court, as it almost certainly will 
never grant certiorari and review their interpretation.  By contrast, 
lower state court judges face a realistic scenario in which a superior 
state court will reverse their interpretation of substantive state law.  
This possibility of reversal creates a motivation for state judges to strive 
to adhere to the views and principles of the state supreme court that 
federal judges do not have. 
Further, when an interpretation of state precedent would have a 
disruptive effect on state government — perhaps throwing existing 
programs into turmoil and threatening the meeting of felt public needs 
— state judges may be more capable of understanding those possible 
consequences than federal judges.70  Those programs address public 
needs in places and communities in which or at least near where state 
judges live, and it is they, not federal judges, who will hear the bulk of 
any ensuing litigation. 
Finally, state judges simply have a better understanding of state law 
and state institutions because they live state law and interact with state 
institutions on a daily basis.71  Of course, federal judges can learn about 
state property law and its nuances, but because they begin with much 
less knowledge, it is also possible that well-financed clients with 
excellent lawyers can convince a federal judge of an interpretation of 
state law that state court judges would not find persuasive.  Moreover, 
especially when the defendant governments are small local 
governments, the plaintiffs in takings cases may have greater resources 
for legal representation than the defendants.72 
 
BEHAVIOR OF FEDERAL JUDGES 83–85 (2013) (discussing evidence of reversal aversion 
among federal judges). 
 70. Steven Eagle dubs what he calls “the proclivity of judges to perceive acutely the 
state’s needs” as a potential state court bias in takings litigation. Steven J. Eagle, 
Judicial Takings and State Takings, 21 WIDENER L.J. 811, 825 (2012). But one could as 
readily dub federal courts’ greater remove and lesser understanding of state regulatory 
needs as a federal court bias. 
 71. Justice Kagan made this point powerfully in her Knick dissent. See Knick v. 
Township of Scott, 139 S. Ct. 2162, 2187–89 (2019) (Kagan, J., dissenting). A number 
of leading academics have emphasized the federal courts’ lack of understanding of 
state and local law as a rationale for judicial federalism. See, e.g., Roderick Hills, Jr., 
The Individual Right to Federalism in the Rehnquist Court, 74 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 
888 (2006). 
 72. For a discussion of takings law that addresses the limited financial capacities of 
small localities, see Christopher Serkin, Big Differences for Small Governments: Local 
Governments and the Takings Clause, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1624 (2006). 
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None of these differences between federal and state judges matter 
where state substantive property law is clear.  But in the many cases of 
unclear substantive state property law, for the reasons listed above, 
federal judges may be more likely than state ones to find that there is 
no background principle that would negate a property rights claim.  Or 
they may be more willing than state judges to stretch a precedent’s or 
statute’s language to support a property rights claim.  Since it is 
ultimately the state courts in our constitutional order who are supposed 
to have the final say on the content of substantive state law, another 
way of stating the point is just this: strategic takings litigants will prefer 
federal courts when they think federal courts will get the substance of 
state law wrong.  And sometimes, litigants will correctly predict that 
federal courts will get it wrong. 
i. Understanding Knick’s Possible Effects Through an Examination of 
Denials of Certiorari Petitions 
One way to get some sense of the possible substantive state property 
law implications of Knick is to consider the cases in which the 
purported victim of an uncompensated taking was willing to litigate 
through the state courts all the way to filing a petition for certiorari in 
the U.S. Supreme Court.  These cases involve highly motivated, well-
resourced parties — parties who, it is reasonable to suppose, would 
have pursued litigation in the federal courts from the outset if they had 
believed they would receive a more favorable reception there than in 
the state courts.73  I reviewed denied certiorari petitions involving 
takings claims in which the government had prevailed in the state 
courts for the years 2010–2017 using a variety of Westlaw searches.  
Overall, I identified 34 denied certiorari petitions filed during this 
period that involved a takings claim in which the government prevailed 
in state court.74  Seven of the 34 petitions involve efforts by the 
petitioners to convince the U.S. Supreme Court to set aside a state 
court’s interpretation of state property law; none of these petitions 
argues a judicial taking theory, but rather simply that the state court 
got state law wrong.  The Supreme Court refused to grant certiorari 
and reread state law in all these seven cases, but after Williamson 
 
 73. Litigating a case all the way to the highest court in a state and then seeking 
certiorari from the U.S. Supreme Court necessitates both motivation and financial 
resources, either on the part of the nominal litigant or aligned groups willing to provide 
financing or pro bono legal services. 
 74. A full list of these petitions is available from the author. Only the ones relevant 
to the question of the content of state property law are discussed in the text. 
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County, the lower federal courts might well have no choice but to hear 
and decide many cases similar to these. 
As explored in the discussion below, these denied petitions 
underscore that the reversal of Williamson County will compel federal 
courts to decide complicated state law issues of riparian and littoral 
rights, water law, and public trust that, in our constitutional order, 
should be decided by the state courts.  These are also areas of law that 
are critical for climate change adaptation, which requires sensitivity to 
local physical conditions and local culture and which, therefore, should 
be (at least primarily) the domain of state institutions and state law.75 
Maunalua Bay Beach Ohana 28 v. Hawaii76 involves the law of 
accretions and avulsions, an area of law that is receiving attention of 
late because of climate change-induced beach erosion and public 
efforts to address it.77  In 2003, the Hawaii legislature enacted a law 
that provided that the state owned all future accretions, except for 
accretions that replaced land previously lost to erosion, in which case 
the landowner bordering the accretion owned the accretion.78  The 
Hawaii Intermediate Court of Appeals held that possible future 
accretions under Hawaii law were not “vested” property, so that the 
Hawaii legislature did not deprive littoral landowners of a property 
interest they owned under state law.  The court relied on two strands 
in Hawaii law: cases regarding future rights to a natural resource that 
 
 75. Another area where the Knick decision may force the federal courts into murky 
state law is the area of fair market valuation for purposes of eminent domain, which 
the federal courts have long left to the states and which is anything but uncomplicated. 
Some of the denied petitions I reviewed in effect asked the Court to rule unlawful a 
valuation method used by a state that was less favorable to them than methods used in 
some other states. See, e.g., Petition for Writ of Certiorari, City of Milwaukee Post No. 
2874 Veterans of Foreign Wars v. Redevelopment Auth. of Milwaukee, 130 S. Ct. 3493 
(2010) (No. 09-1204) (challenging the Wisconsin courts’ use of the undivided fee rule 
in eminent domain, whereby the fair market value of a condemned building is assessed 
based on valuing the total building rather than by separately valuing components and 
the total valuation is then allocated among component owners). 
 76. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Maunalua Bay Beach Ohana v. Hawaii, 131 S. 
Ct. 529 (2010) (No. 10-331). 
 77. “Accreted land is dry land added to an upland parcel caused by the slow 
attachment of sediment, ‘by small and imperceptible degrees.’” Josh Eagle, Taking the 
Oceanfront Lot, 91 IND. L.J. 851, 874 n.132 (2016) (quoting Jones v. Johnston, 59 U.S. 
(18 How.) 150, 156 (1855)). As Josh Eagle explains: 
In many, but not all states, the law distinguishes between these slow forms of 
change and rapid forms of change: where change occurs slowly, the legal 
coastline moves with the water line; where it occurs rapidly, the legal coastline 
remains where it was prior to the event . . . . All rapid change is generally 
known as “avulsion.” 
Id. 
 78. HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 501-33 (2019). 
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were not yet being exercised and cases regarding the Hawaii public 
trust doctrine as applied to submerged shoreline areas.79  According to 
the Hawaii appellate court, Hawaii case law made the right to future 
accretions an inherently contingent right subject to legislative actions 
motivated by public trust-like concerns related to the ocean and 
shoreline.  The petitioners argued that the Hawaii courts were 
mistaken in finding that there was no vested right in future accretions 
and, in effect, asked the Supreme Court to reject Hawaii’s 
interpretation of its own background principles of state law.  In the 
post-Knick legal regime, a federal district court and a federal appellate 
court might well have been tasked to sort out the arcane complexities 
of Hawaii property law as they bore on the challenged state statute, 
and those federal courts could have come to different conclusions than 
did the Hawaii state court. 
In a number of petitions, the petitioners, in effect, asked the 
Supreme Court to re-conceive the state water law system in a way that 
could throw water institutions and planning into turmoil.  For example, 
in Kobobel v. Colorado, the State of Colorado issued cease and desist 
orders prohibiting well owners from pumping water from their 
irrigation wells until the water court entered a plan for water-supply 
augmentation.80  The well owners complied with the cease and desist 
orders but contended that the state’s action rendered their farming 
operations essentially worthless, thus entitling them to compensation 
for the unconstitutional taking of their vested property rights.81  The 
Colorado water court and the Colorado Supreme Court held that the 
well owners’ takings argument misconceived the scope of their water 
rights, explaining that under Colorado’s prior appropriation doctrine, 
the well owners’ vested priority date has always been subject to the 
rights of senior water rights holders and the amount of water available 
in the tributary system.82  The petitioner argued that the Supreme 
Court should correct the Colorado courts’ misunderstanding of the 
water property rights regime in Colorado and recognize that the State 
had taken their property in water withdrawal rights.  If the Supreme 
Court had so held, that would have destabilized the complex, nuanced 
prior appropriation and augmentation system that allows the Colorado 
 
 79. Maunalua Bay Beach Ohana 28 v. State of Hawaii, 222 P.3d 441, 460–61 (Haw. 
Ct. App. 2009). 
 80. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 3, Kobobel v. Colorado, 132 S. Ct. 252 (2011) 
(No.11-111). 
 81. See id. 
 82. Kobobel v. State Dep’t of Nat. Res., 249 P.3d 1127, 1137 (Colo. 2011). 
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economy and burgeoning population to function under conditions of 
continuing water scarcity.83 
In Nies v. Town of Emerald Isle, the petition challenged a North 
Carolina statute that purported to codify a public trust and customary 
right of public and governmental access over privately held dry 
beaches.84  The North Carolina courts held that the specific public 
access of which the petitioners complained — the local government 
driving over dry sand for emergency and other public needs — was not 
a taking but rather an activity that was permitted without 
compensation because of longtime limitation in private title rooted in 
state public trust doctrine.85  The petitioners essentially asked the 
Supreme Court to mandate a version of the public trust in North 
Carolina that differed from what the North Carolina courts understood 
the public trust doctrine of that state to be.  Public trust is an area of 
law where great variation among the states has long dominated, 
reflecting different histories, legal traditions, and physical conditions in 
the states.86  If Knick opens the federal courts to interpret public trust 
in the different states, public trust might become more homogeneous 
and less suited to local conditions. 
One might reply to my criticisms of the way in which Knick invites 
federal usurpation of state property law with the point that Stop the 
Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Florida Department of Environmental 
Protection87 already had done so and that Knick thus is in line with 
 
 83. For other examples of certiorari petitions asking the Supreme Court to correct 
state courts’ alleged mistakes regarding state water law and water institutions, see 
Petition for Writ of Cetiorari, Del Mar v. Imperial Irrigation Dist., 133 S. Ct. 312 (2012) 
(No. 12-53) (arguing that the allocation of water to urban areas by the Imperial 
Irrigation Water district effected a taking of the water rights of rural landowners); 
Petition for Writ of Certiorari, E-L Enterprises, Inc. v. Milwaukee Metro. Sewage 
Dist., 131 S. Ct. 798 (2010) (No. 10-448) (arguing that the Wisconsin Supreme Court 
erred in holding that the local government had no liability for groundwater 
withdrawals under Wisconsin law). 
 84. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 3, Nies v. Town of Emerald Isle, 138 S. Ct. 75 
(2017) (No. 16-1305). 
 85. See Nies v. Emerald Isle, 780 S.E.2d 187, 197–99 (N.C. App. 2015). 
 86. Brief in Opposition at 36, Nies, 138 S. Ct. 75 (No. 16-1305) (arguing that “[i]n 
this unique area, different States have developed, over centuries, different laws to 
address different local circumstances, history, and customs. Such differences in State 
policy and custom that shape unique beach property laws are the birthright of our 
federalist system.”). See generally Robin Kundis Craig, A Comparative Guide to the 
Western States’ Public Trust Doctrines: Public Values, Private Rights, and the 
Evolution Toward an Ecological Public Trust, 37 ECOLOGY L.Q. 53 (2010). 
 87. Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Fla. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., 560 U.S. 702, 
713–14 (2010) (suggesting that a state court can take property under the Fifth 
Amendment by eliminating established property rights but concluding that the Florida 
courts had not done so in this case). 
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current law.  To an extent, that is true: to determine whether a judicial 
taking had occurred, a federal court would need to characterize both 
the state law before the alleged judicial taking and after and in some 
cases that would entail rejecting the state courts’ characterization of 
their own property law as essentially constant.  However, it is 
important to recall that in Stop the Beach, only a plurality of justices 
endorses the judicial takings category,88 and under the pre-Williamson 
County regime, any judicial takings cases would be heard by only one 
court — the U.S. Supreme Court — and then only on certiorari.89  And 
indeed, the Supreme Court has not accepted certiorari on any case 
styled as a judicial taking case since Stop the Beach. 
C. Mitigating Knick’s Intrusion into Substantive State Property Law 
If the preceding analysis is correct, the question arises: Is there any 
way to mitigate the distortions to state property law that Knick’s 
opening of the federal courts to takings claims otherwise would result 
in? 
This Section considers three possible paths of mitigation: abstention, 
state legislative and state court corrections, and federal court 
certification.  Under prudential abstention as established by Railroad 
Commission of Texas v. Pullman Co.90 and Burford v. Sun Oil Co.,91 
federal courts can abstain from hearing cases that turn on unclear 
issues of state law, but the federal courts are unlikely to consistently 
rely on these abstention doctrines to avoid deciding takings cases in the 
wake of Knick.  Some of the “mistakes” in state substantive law created 
by the federal courts could be corrected by state courts and legislatures, 
but the opportunities for such corrections may be very limited in 
reality.  Perhaps the most promising means of mitigating Knick’s 
effects on state substantive property law would be for federal courts to 
routinely certify state property law issues to the relevant state supreme 
court.  While certification, too, has its limits, it should be encouraged 
by the Supreme Court and federal courts of appeals in inverse 
condemnation suits, and the state courts and legislatures should adopt 
rules that allow for certification in the widest possible set of 
circumstances. 
 
 88. Only Justices Scalia, Roberts, Thomas, and Alito joined the plurality opinion, 
and only the plurality opinion acknowledged that there could be a valid judicial takings 
claim. Id. at 706. 
 89. See supra text accompanying notes 17–21 (describing the jurisdictional limits 
imposed by Williamson County). 
 90. 312 U.S. 496 (1941). 
 91. 319 U.S. 315 (1943). 
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i. Abstention and Justice Sotomayor’s Question 
At one of the oral arguments in Knick, Justice Sotomayor suggested 
that overturning Williamson County would not necessarily guarantee 
property owners a federal forum for takings claims because federal 
district courts could abstain from hearing these cases under one of the 
prudential abstention doctrines that the Supreme Court has 
recognized.92  Indeed, some federal circuits before Williamson County 
did employ abstention doctrines in takings cases to either stay federal 
proceedings pending the outcome of a state lawsuit (as in Pullman 
abstention) or to dismiss the federal proceeding altogether (as in 
Burford abstention).93  Williamson County effectively removed the 
occasion for courts to consider Pullman or Burford abstention in 
takings cases: because Williamson County generally required federal 
courts to dismiss federal takings claims on ripeness grounds, federal 
courts no longer needed to engage the question of whether dismissal 
was proper and prudent under an abstention doctrine.94  Now, with 
Knick’s overruling of Williamson County, one might suppose federal 
district courts might revert to pre-Williamson County abstention 
practices in takings cases, and appeals courts might allow them to do 
so. 
There are several reasons, however, to doubt that, post-Knick, 
federal courts will feel free to abstain in inverse condemnation suits 
brought pursuant to Section 1983.  For one, at least in theory, both 
Burford and Pullman abstention are supposed to be extraordinary, 
exceptional acts of prudential judicial discretion, and thus not to be 
readily exercised.95  Even before Williamson County, the Supreme 
Court in Hawaii Housing Authority v. Midkiff96 and the Ninth Circuit 
in Pearl Investment Co. v. San Francisco97 expressed doubts about the 
appropriateness of abstention in inverse condemnation suits.  Given 
 
 92. Transcript of Oral Argument at 5–9, Knick v. Township of Scott, 138 S. Ct. 1262 
(2018) (No. 17-647). 
 93. See R.S. Radford & Jennifer Fry Thompson, The Accidental Abstention 
Doctrine: After Thirty Years, the Case for Diverting Federal Takings Claims to State 
Court Under Williamson County Has Yet to Be Made, 67 BAYLOR L. REV. 567, 596–
603 (2016). 
 94. Id. at 571. 
 95. See STEVEN H. STEINGLASS, SECTION 1983 LITIGATION IN STATE COURTS § 6:20 
(2018) (“Moreover, the Court has subsequently made clear that federal courts have a 
‘virtually unflagging obligation’ to exercise jurisdiction, and abstention, including 
Burford abstention, is only appropriate in extraordinary or unusual circumstances.” 
(citations omitted)). 
 96. 467 U.S. 229, 237 n.4 (1984). 
 97. 774 F.2d 1460, 1465 n.3 (9th Cir. 1985). 
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that (under San Remo) issue preclusion in effect may eliminate any 
advantage a litigant would have in bringing a federal suit after the state 
court had resolved issues essential to the federal takings claim, many 
federal courts might feel that abstention is unfair to the party claiming 
a taking.  Issue preclusion at a minimum would provide a litigant who 
had chosen the federal forum with a powerful argument as to why the 
federal court should not abstain.98  Indeed, the rhetoric of the Knick 
opinion, with its denunciation of the “preclusion trap” and its  
emphasis on the importance and high stature of property rights,99 
suggests lower federal courts almost always should decline to abstain 
in inverse condemnation takings cases. 
Moreover, even if the courts of appeals and Supreme Court do not 
read Knick as precluding abstention and instead leave it to the district 
courts to decide whether to abstain in inverse condemnation suits, it 
seems plausible to believe that those judges who are comparatively 
more concerned with fidelity to state law and the operation of state 
regulatory institutions will abstain, while those who are comparatively 
more concerned with safeguarding property rights will choose not to 
abstain, all else being equal.100  The question of whether state law is so 
unclear and the state law issues so complex that abstention is 
appropriate may often be one upon which federal judges, in good faith, 
can disagree.  Albeit unconsciously, the ideological commitments of 
judges may influence their views on whether the abstention is 
appropriate.  In other words, because of the broad discretion that a 
federal judge has over whether to abstain, the most conservative judges 
within the federal judiciary after Knick may hear an outsized 
proportion of the takings cases involving unclear state law. 
If that is true, abstention doctrine operating in conjunction with 
Knick’s removal of the state litigation requirement may result in a body 
of federal interpretations of substantive state property law that 
diverges more from what the state courts would have decided than 
 
 98. See STEINGLASS, supra note 95, § 6:19 (“The Supreme Court’s decision in San 
Remo Hotel v. City and County of San Francisco effectively precludes property owners 
from filing § 1983 taking claims in federal court and relying on Pullman abstention as 
a strategy for retaining access to federal court while giving state courts an opportunity 
to apply state compensation remedies.”). 
 99. See Knick v. Township of Scott, 139 S. Ct. 2162, 2169–72 (2019) (employing 
strong rhetoric criticizing Williamson County and exalting property rights protections). 
 100. A district court’s decision whether or not to abstain is subject only to review for 
abuse of discretion. See, e.g., Garamendi v. Allstate, 47 F.3d 350, 354 (9th Cir. 1995) 
(“[T]he district court’s decision whether or not to abstain is reviewed for an abuse of 
discretion.” (citations omitted)). 
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would have been the case in the absence of judges having any discretion 
to decide whether to abstain. 
ii. Legislative and State Court Corrections 
Another possible means of mitigating the distortions Knick may 
create in terms of substantive state property law would be for the state 
courts and/or legislatures to correct any errors regarding state law in 
federal courts’ opinions in inverse condemnation cases.  For instance, 
a state supreme court could simply rule that what the United States 
District Court for the District of Colorado said about prior 
appropriation and riparian rights under Colorado law was a 
misstatement of state law.  Or the state legislature could pass a law 
clarifying exactly what those rights are.  Any such action on the part of 
the state courts or state legislature could not undo final federal 
decisions, but it could prevent future reliance on misstatements of state 
law by the federal courts. 
Such corrections, however, are not readily achieved.  State courts 
cannot sua sponte correct federal court misinterpretations of state law: 
there needs to be a case brought to the state courts involving the same 
issue of state law, and there may never be such a case, or at least there 
may not be one for many years.  The longer a federal court remains on 
the books with its misinterpretation of state law, the more people — 
including, notably, state and local government officials — will be 
forced to rely on that interpretation, to the point that it may become a 
de facto reality that a state court will hesitate to overturn. 
Legislatures, of course, are not limited to expressing views in cases 
brought by litigants.  However, legislatures generally operate under 
conditions of limited resources for legislating.  It takes a great deal to 
get a bill written, introduced, vetted, and actually enacted.  A 
legislature thus may seek to act, if at all, only on issues with the most 
powerful interest group backing or the most salience for media 
coverage and the general public;101 otherwise, legislative inertia may 
carry the day.102  Thus, state legislatures may not seek to correct 
 
 101. This, at any rate, is how state legislators are understood in the highly influential 
“public choice” school of political economy. See, e.g., Edward A. Zelinsky, Unfunded 
Mandates, Hidden Taxation, and the Tenth Amendment: On Public Choice, Public 
Interest, and Public Services, 46 VAND. L. REV. 1355, 1357 (1993) (describing a model 
of state legislation as “the products of self-seeking, poorly monitored state legislators 
who act within a zone of discretion and opportunistically accommodate interest 
groups”). 
 102. On legislative inertia, see, for example, Richard Neely, Obsolete Statutes, Due 
Process, and the Power of Courts to Demand a Second Legislative Look, 131 U. PA. L. 
REV. 271, 274 (“[A] legislature is not a neutral, majoritarian body that impartially 
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misinterpretations of state law by federal courts except in cases where 
there is great disruption and outrage caused by the federal decision.103 
iii. Certification: The Limits of Certification, and Reforms 
The ideal solution to Knick’s de facto requirement that federal 
courts decide even uncertain substantive property law issues is for the 
federal courts to certify the legal issues to the relevant state supreme 
court.  However, there are already substantial delays regarding 
certification requests in some states (notably California104), and an 
increase in certification requests because of Knick could increase 
delays to the point where litigants and federal courts would forego 
considering certification.  As it is, certification is always based on the 
judge’s assessment of whether the state law is uncertain enough to 
warrant certification, and, as such, may be avoided by the very federal 
judges who are relatively inattentive to the complexities of state law in 
the first place.  Thus, certification poses some of the same problems as 
abstention as a means of mitigating Knick’s intrusion into state 
substantive law. 
In addition, some federal courts of appeal have expressed a 
somewhat restrictive, hesitant attitude toward certification as a general 
matter, which may mean that they will not readily certify state property 
issues to state supreme courts and that the district courts within these 
circuits may likewise understand that they should eschew 
certification.105  Finally, while certification to the state supreme court 
 
studies all intelligent suggestions for law changes; rather, it is a machine deliberately, 
intelligently, and efficiently designed to say ‘no’ unless some Herculean force kicks it 
in its institutional tail.”); Molly J. Walker Wilson & Megan P. Fuchs, Publicity, 
Pressure, and Environmental Legislation: The Untold Story of Availability 
Campaigns, 30 CARDOZO L. REV. 2147, 2179 n.107 (2009) (“[L]egislative stagnation is 
not unique to environmental law but is also pervasive in other legal fields and in the 
U.S. legal system as a whole.”). 
 103. Even in a hypothetical case where the federal courts arrive at a different 
interpretation of state property law than the state courts would have, and the majority 
in the state legislature affirmatively supports the federal interpretation, one can say 
that state property law has been distorted unless that legislative  majority would have 
invested the time and political capital to successfully override the state court 
interpretation. 
 104. See Frank Chang, You Have Not Because You Ask Not: Why Federal Courts 
Do Not Certify Questions of State Law to State Courts, 85 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 251, 
269 (2017) (discussing delays). For a thoughtful discussion of the jurisprudential issues 
posed by certification, see Jonathan Nash, Examining the Power of Federal Court to 
Certify Questions of State Law, 88 CORNELL L. REV. 1672 (2003). 
 105. See, e.g., Copier v. Smith & Wesson Corp., 138 F.3d 833, 838 (10th Cir. 1998) 
(“[J]ust because a new state law question is raised, ‘[c]ertification is not to be routinely 
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is now available in 49 states plus the District of Columbia,106 the 
applicable state statutes and rules in a minority of jurisdictions allow 
for certification only from a federal court of appeals.107  For a range of 
reasons, either property owners or governments may choose not to 
appeal a federal district court decision that contains a misinterpretation 
of substantive state property law.  In some instances, an appeal by the 
government simply will not be possible, as (for example) where a court 
disagreed with the government’s interpretation of state property law 
but nonetheless agreed there was no taking or no loss in market value 
and hence no compensation due. 
A number of steps or reforms could facilitate more certification after 
Knick.  The U.S. Supreme Court could explicitly encourage such 
certification.  Justice Kagan’s dissent in Knick addresses certification, 
but the majority is notably silent about it.108  The federal courts of 
appeals, as distinct legal institutions, could also explicitly endorse and 
encourage certification in such cases.  The state legislatures could 
increase the budgets of state supreme courts so that they could process 
certification requests more expeditiously.  Moreover, and perhaps 
most obviously, states could modify their statutes and court rules to 
allow for certification to the state supreme court from any federal 
court, rather than only from a federal court of appeals. 
III. HOW KNICK COULD BLUR CURRENT FEDERAL TAKINGS LAW 
DOCTRINE 
Knick may not only change substantive state property law but may 
also move the courts toward a more property rights-protective, pro-
 
invoked whenever a federal court is presented with an unsettled question of state law.’” 
(citations omitted)); see also Chang, supra note 104, at 269. 
 106. Chang, supra note 104, at 268. 
 107. Id. For example, Pennsylvania only allows for certification from a federal court 
of appeals or the United States Supreme Court. See PA. R. APP. P. 3341. Other states, 
such as Washington, allow certification from any federal court. See WASH REV. CODE 
§ 2.60.020 (1965) (“When . . . it is necessary to ascertain the local law of this state in 
order to dispose of such proceeding and the local law has not been clearly determined, 
such federal court may certify to the supreme court for answer the question of local 
law involved and the supreme court shall render its opinion in answer thereto.”); see 
also Rebecca A. Cochran, Federal Court Certification of Questions of State Law to 
State Courts: A Theoretical and Empirical Study, 29 J. LEGIS. 157, 167–68 (2013) (“The 
largest states, California, Illinois, and New York, and eight other states, including New 
Jersey, Pennsylvania, and Texas, chose the narrowest scope for certification. These 
narrow jurisdictions typically deny not only all state courts, but federal district courts 
the power to certify, limiting the scope of the certification provision to a single federal 
court of appeals or all federal courts of appeal . . . .”). 
 108. See Knick v. Township of Scott, 139 S. Ct. 2162, 2188–89 (2019). 
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compensation version of substantive federal takings doctrine.  In 
particular, Knick seems to call into question the ruling in Tahoe that 
temporary regulatory deprivations of all value are not per se 
compensable.109  Knick arguably suggests that temporary regulatory 
deprivation of all beneficial use or economic value, at least if the 
temporary deprivation lasts a substantial time, is subject to the per se 
compensation rule set forth in Lucas.110 
At least prior to Knick, the Supreme Court’s takings doctrine was 
reasonably clear regarding the government’s temporary physical 
invasions of property and temporary prohibitions on all development.  
In the case of both alleged temporary physical and regulatory 
interferences with property rights, the Court disavowed any per se rule; 
instead, whether the landowner was due compensation depended on a 
multi-factor balancing test of one sort or the other in which the 
duration of the government’s invasion or regulatory prohibition was 
one factor.111 
Knick suggests, however, that a possible reading of First English 
before First English was clarified by Tahoe — that First English 
establishes that temporary takings of all beneficial use or economic 
value are per se compensable, with just minor exception for routine 
administrative delays — was correct and is the current law.  First 
English is a confusing and opaque opinion, but it does contain language 
that supports the view (explicitly disavowed in Tahoe) that temporary 
regulatory losses of all use or value are per se compensable — the 
Court in First English did say that “‘temporary’ takings which, as here, 
deny a landowner all use of his property, are not different in kind from 
permanent takings, for which the Constitution clearly requires 
compensation.”112 
The language of the Knick opinion seems to embrace this reading of 
First English’s holding, as if it had not been clarified at all by the 
 
 109. Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302, 
342 (2002). 
 110. Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1015–19 (1992). 
 111. See Ark. Game & Fish Comm’n v. United States, 568 U.S. 23, 38 (2012) (“When 
regulation or temporary physical invasion by government interferes with private 
property, our decisions recognize, time is indeed a factor in determining the existence 
vel non of a compensable taking.”); Tahoe, 535 U.S. at 342 (duration of regulatory 
restriction is a factor for court to consider within the context of the Penn Central 
balancing test); Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 435 
n.12 (1982) (holding temporary physical invasions should be assessed by case-specific 
factual inquiry). 
 112. First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. Los Angeles County, 482 U.S. 
304, 318 (1987). 
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majority in Tahoe.  Thus, in addition to generally holding that Fifth 
Amendment property rights need to be accorded the same stature as 
other individual rights, the Knick Court addresses First English as if it 
decided the question of temporary takings once and for all and Tahoe 
had never been decided: 
[In Williamson County,] [t]he Court granted certiorari to decide 
whether the Fifth Amendment entitles a property owner to just 
compensation when a regulation temporarily deprives him of the use 
of his property.  (First English later held that the answer was yes.)113 
But it is not just the language of Knick about First English that 
suggests an implicit overruling of Tahoe and an affirmation of 
something like a per se compensation rule for temporary deprivations 
of use.  Rather, the reasoning of the Knick opinion also implicitly 
supports this conclusion.  On a certain level, the basic idea of Knick is 
that property owners deserve respect, and thus it is too disrespectful to 
be constitutional to make property owners wait for compensation.  
Therefore, property owners should not have to wait to get a hearing in 
the same federal forum as is available to all other victims of 
unconstitutional action.  They should not have to wait as they litigate 
their takings claim way through the state courts.114  This idea in Knick 
is logically different from — but not so far removed from — the idea 
that property owners deserve respect and, therefore, it is too 
disrespectful to allow the government to physically occupy their 
property or prohibit the use of the property for months or years and 
get away without paying on the grounds that the government action is 
just temporary.  Just as property owners should not have to wait 
through state inverse condemnation litigation to get to a federal forum 
that offers compensation, property owners should not have to wait to 
see if the government invasion of their property or regulatory 
prohibition is going to go on long enough that it is no longer 
“temporary” but rather de facto permanent and hence per se 
compensable.  Instead, property owners burdened with “temporary” 
deprivations of their property should be able to access the federal 
courts and receive compensation as a matter of categorical right, 
consistent with the “full-fledged constitutional status” of the Takings 
Clause.115 
 
 113. Knick, 139 S. Ct. at 2174. 
 114. See supra text accompanying notes 34–44 (explicating what I term a broad 
reading of Knick). 
 115. Knick, 139 S. Ct. at 2170. 
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If I am correct, and Knick in effect overrules Tahoe, then state and 
local governments may lose the regulatory flexibility that they need to 
arrive at pragmatic solutions to problems such as (in Tahoe) water 
pollution and loss of water quality from increasing residential 
development or any of a number of difficult problems associated with 
climate change — like flooding and land loss due to sea-level rise.116  
As the Tahoe majority explained: 
The interest in facilitating informed decision-making by regulatory 
agencies counsels against adopting a per se rule that would impose 
such severe costs on their deliberations.  Otherwise, the financial 
constraints of compensating property owners during a moratorium 
may force officials to rush through the planning process or to abandon 
the practice altogether.117 
Ultimately, Knick’s implications for takings doctrine depend on how 
state courts, lower federal courts, and the U.S. Supreme Court construe 
and build on Knick in subsequent cases.  That, in turn, will depend on 
the composition of those courts, especially the U.S. Supreme Court.118  
With the loss of Justice Kennedy, who was a swing vote in takings cases, 
the Court may now have as part of its agenda an elevation of property 
rights concerns and a de-emphasis of environmental and other societal 
concerns. 
 
 116. See J. Peter Byrne, Rising Seas and Common Law Baselines: A Comment on 
Regulatory Takings Discourse Concerning Climate Change, 11 VT. J. ENVTL. L. 625, 
626 (2011) (discussing litigation challenges to laws and regulations addressing sea-level 
rise). 
 117. Tahoe, 535 U.S. at 339. 
 118. Relatedly, Knick’s holding that a constitutional right to compensation obtains 
as soon as the government “takes” property calls into question the constitutionally 
permissible range of flexibility states and localities enjoy in eminent domain 
procedures, and in particular in the use of “quick take” eminent domain. The federal 
courts have largely allowed states to fashion their own laws as to precisely when 
compensation will be provided when a state or local government formally condemns 
property. In some states, under some circumstances, the government lawfully can 
quick-take a property — physically seize it — while depositing the government’s 
estimate of just compensation in a special account. See generally 27 AM. JUR. 2D 
Eminent Domain § 630 (2019); 29 C.J.S. Eminent Domain § 263 (1929). If the property 
owner disagrees with the valuation, he or she is, in effect, dispossessed without 
compensation until a settlement or court award of compensation is made. Quick-take 
laws have been challenged in state courts, and the courts have largely upheld such laws 
where they are used on the grounds that exigencies required the government to possess 
the property immediately. Knick calls into question quick take laws, or at least suggests 
that some applications of them may be unconstitutional, because it stresses the 
immediacy of the right to compensation once a taking has occurred. 
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CONCLUSION 
Knick does not read like a big opinion; it has not received a great 
deal of general press attention, and the media attention it did receive 
related mostly to the Court’s discussion of stare decisis and what that 
discussion suggests about the Court’s willingness generally to overturn 
its own precedents.119  But Knick, in addition to having obvious 
procedural implications, has the potential to federalize state property 
law to a degree and to move federal takings doctrine toward a more 
rigid, per se rule approach.  Certification to state courts may mitigate 
Knick’s effects.  However, it seems unavoidable now, especially as state 
property law collides with the realities of climate change, that strategic 
litigants will head to federal court precisely when they think the federal 
judiciary will interpret state property law differently from how the state 
courts would have interpreted it.  Knick thus almost certainly will 
compromise the state courts’ unquestionably legitimate role as the final 
interpreters of the content of state property law. 
 
 119. See, e.g., Adam Liptak, In Property Rights Case, Justices Sharply Debate 
Power of Precedent, N.Y. TIMES (June 21, 2019), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/06/21/us/politics/supreme-court-precedent.html 
[https://perma.cc/FR54-3BQN] (focusing on the stare decisis aspect of the Knick 
decision). 
